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Legislative Intent and Statutory
Interpretation in England and
the United States: An Assessment
of the Impact of Pepper V Hart
MICHAEL P. HEALY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation is the process of discerning the meaning of
legislation, and U.S. law has permitted courts to find meaning through a
variety of often contradictory interpretive approaches. As a result, U.S.
litigants often are uncertain about the interpretive approach a court will
apply to a statute, even though the choice of the interpretive approach
may determine the outcome of the litigation.' Until the recent decision
in Pepper (Inspectorof Taxes) v. Hart,2 English approaches to statutory interpretation were more circumscribed because English courts foreclosed
the intentionalist approach. This Article considers the impact that Pepper
has had on statutory interpretation in England.

* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania; BA 1978, Williams College. This Article expands significantly upon ideas that were first
presented in "An American Lawyer's Reflections on Pepper v. Hart," which was published in Volume 2 of Coventry University's LawJournal. That Article was written in 1997 while the author
was a Visiting Lecturer at Coventry University, England. Preparation of this revised and expanded Article was supported by the University of Kentucky College of Law through a summer
research grant. The author thanks John Rogers for his comments on an earlier draft of the Article and Blake Hornal, Class of 1999, for his work as research assistant.
1 Because the stakes are often high, U.S. courts and commentators take full advantage of
the numerous opportunities to debate and chide adherents of different approaches to statutory
interpretation. For example, see the opinions criticizing the majority's approach to statutory interpretation in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 198, 228-29 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Marshall, 908
E2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, CJ., dissenting), afJfd sub nona. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468 (1991). For examples of the scholarly debate over statutory interpretation, see sources cited in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 751 n.3 (2d ed.

1995).
2 [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.).
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The second Part of the Article briefly describes the broad range of
conflicting approaches to statutory interpretation that jurists now commonly employ in U.S. courts. It then contrasts the interpretive rules of
U.S. law with those of English law. Part three of the Article discusses the
House of Lords decision in Pepper,which abandoned the bar against intentionalist interpretation. This part shows how the House of Lords endeavored to protect English statutory interpretation from being
Americanized by adopting several threshold requirements intended to
ensure that courts would pursue intentionalist interpretations only in
rare cases. Part four considers whether the House of Lords succeeded in
placing principled limits on intentionalist interpretations of English
statutes.
The Article concludes that English rules of statutory interpretation
have become much more like U.S. rules and that Pepper itself shows how
English law can be transformed, notwithstanding the House of Lords' effort to place principled, clear, and significant limits on intentionalist interpretation.
II. CONTRASTING U.S. AND ENGLISH RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
A. U.S. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
U.S. rules long have been quite untidy with respect to the permitted
approaches to statutory interpretation. At present, there are at least
three distinct approaches courts may employ to determine the meaning
of a statutory text: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism (also
called modified intentionalism).3 Followers of each defend their preferred approach as being consistent with the principle of legislative supremacy. This claim can be made because each approach purports to
follow the directives of the legislature in assigning meaning to the statute
enacted by it. The approaches differ in where and how the courts will
discern the legislative directives.
The textualist approach has undergone a recent renaissance following the appointment of many politically conservative judges by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 4 Most prominent among these jurists are
Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas 5 and Seventh Circuit Court

3 SeeWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretationas PracticalReasoning
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990).
4 SeeWilliam N. Eskrid~e,Jr., The New Textualim, 37 U.G.LA L. REV. 621 (1991); RichardJ.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Courts New Hypertextualim An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995).
5 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 351, 363 (1994) (remarking thatJustice Scalia's insistence on the "virtues of textualism" and

the "evils of legislative history" seems to have influenced Justice Thomas' approach to statutory
interpretation). Justice Scalia has been characterized as "the most prominent textualist on the
contemporary Supreme Court." WILLIAM D. POPIIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PRoCESS 337 (1993).
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of Appeals Judge Easterbrook. 6 The avowed goal of textualism is objectivity, and the general rule of this approach is that courts must rely solely
on the words of the statute to determine its meaning. 7 In the view of textualists, this objectivity reinforces separation of powers principles and
rule of law values. 8 Textualists are particularly wary about using legislative history to discern the meaning of statutes. 9
A second approach is the intentionalist approach, which seeks to interpret legislation based on legislative intent. Intentionalists discern legislative intent from statutory text and legislative history.10 Critics of
intentionalism argue that it erroneously imputes a singular intent to a
large group of legislators." Moreover, the willingness of intentionalists
to inquire beyond the statutory text contrasts starkly with textualism and

6 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CmI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (arguing that a
court has no authority to construe statutes on the basis of legislative history indicative of either
Congressional intent or purpose).
7 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 352 ("The critical assumption [of textualism] is that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective; that is, the judge should ask what the ordinary
reader of a statute would have understood the words to mean at the time of enactment, not what
the intentions of the enacting legislature were." (footnote omitted)); WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (2d ed.
1997) (Textualists "prefer an image of the text as an independently observable fact on which
judges can rely.").
8 See POPKIN, supra note 7, at 174-75.
9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 59, 62 (1988) ("The use of original intent rather than an objective inquiry into the
reasonable import of the language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the
discretion, and therefore the power, of the court."); see alsoPierce, supranote 4, at 777-78.
10 The use of legislative history to construe legislative intent first occurred in the U.S. Supreme Court more than one hundred years ago. See Hans W. Baade, "OriginalIntent" in Historical
Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1079 (1991) (describing Dubuque & Pac.
RR v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66 (1860), as the case in which "the Supreme Court first resorted to legislative history in aid of statutory construction." (footnote omitted)); see alsoJorge L.
Carro & Andrew P Brann, The U.S. Supmme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical
Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICSJ. 294, 302 (1982) (explaining that, since 1938, there has been, in generai, a continual increase in usage of legislative historical documents on the part of the Supreme
Court").
I I See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 68-79 (1975)
(summarizing scholarly critiques of intentionalism); see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 319-26 (1985) (critiquingJustice Rehnquist's reliance on intentionalism in his dissent
in Weber, 443 U.S. at 219). Critics of the House of Lords decision in Pepper have relied prominently on this theoretical criticism of intentionalism. See Scott C. Styles, The Rule of Parliament:
Statutory Interpretation afterPepper v. Hart, 14 OXFORDJ. OF LEGAL STUD. 151, 154 (1994) ("Parliament is made up of two Houses, each with hundreds of members, [thus,] it is impossible for
any one individual to claim to speak on behalf of Parliament, to convey the intentions of Parliament.... [1]t therefore followed that the intention of the Parliament, in so far as the phrase had
any utility at all, was confined to the words of the statutes themselves.").
It is submitted that evidence of ministerial statements is not relevant evidence because,
allowing that statutes should be interpreted according to the intention of Parliament,
no individual member of Parliament is in a position to state what that intention is or to
speak for the silent majority. Parliament acts as a corporate body and the only expression of its common intention is the text to which the Queen and both Houses have
given their unqualified assent.
J.H. Baker, Case and Comment: StatutoryInterpretationandParliamentaryIntention, 52 CAMBRIDGE LJ.
353, 354 (1993); id. at 357 ("It is surely an unwarranted assumption that a minister's interpretation of an ambiguous Bill indicated the intention even of the House of Commons, let alone of
Parliament."). Professor Baker faults the decision in Pepperfor failing to address this criticism of
intentionalism. See id at 356 ("It is remarkable that these well-known principles were not properly discussed in Pepper v. Hart.").
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leaves the intentionalist approach subject to the criticism that it gives too
12
much interpretive discretion to courts:
Historically, reference by the courts to legislative intent was the
subject of intense critical analysis. Such criticism argued that
judges frequently used legislative intent to trump statutory language that the judges disfavor. In other words, if they did not
like the outcome effected by the statutory language, they would
declare that a favored outcome was required by legislative intent.13
Textualists are foundationalists who will, at least initially, refer only to
text for meaning.1 4 They will consider external sources only if the statutory text is ambiguous15 or leads to an apparently absurd result. 16 Intentionalists, however, are typically nonfoundationalists; 17 they will consider
any evidence of legislative intent, including both text and legislative history, to find the meaning of apparently clear statutes.1 8 The difference
between a foundationalist and a nonfoundationalist approach appears at
its core to be a question of whether meaning must be determined by text
or context. 19 Intentionalists are typically contextualists, while textualists
20
are, well, textualists.
12 See POPKIN, supra note 7, at 174-75; see also Felix Frankfurter, Foreword-A Symposium on
Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1950) ("In one of those felicitous sentences
which Mr. Justice Holmes tossed off in a letter, he characterized intention as 'a residuary clause
intended to gather up whatever other aids there may be to interpretation beside the particular
words and the dictionary.'" (citation omitted)).
13 ABNERJ. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
THE LEGISLATIVE PRoCEsS 7 (1997).
14 In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917), a textualist U.S. Supreme Court
explained:
[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the
legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations
drawn from titles or designating names or reports accompanying their introduction, or
from any extraneous source. In other words, the language being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impractical consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate
legislative intent.
15 SeeJAMES WILAR HURST, DEALING WITH STArUTES 55 (1982) (discussing standard textualist rule that "before [judges] will consider evidence of legislative intent outside the words of
the statute they must be persuaded that the words taken in themselves are of uncertain meaning").
16 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (KennedyJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that when clear language of a statute leads to an absurd result, the Court may look beyond the statutory text for meaning); Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the
Court may "consult all public materials, including... legislative history" when the plain meaning
of a statutory text is absurd in order to ascertain whether Congress actually intended that mean-

ing).
17 Another commentator on Pepper has distinguished between textualism's exclusive approach to the source of statutory meaning (the statutory text) and intentionalism's "inclusiist"
approach, which allows the use of legislative history as well as text to fix meaning. See Styles, supra
note 11, at 152.
18 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (stating that
"[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
'superficial examination'") (footnotes omitted).
19 Professor Hurst has concluded that American jurists are typically nonfoundationalists
who do not believe that they are bound by a determinate and nonabsurd text:
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The third common approach to interpretation in the United States is
purposivism. This approach seeks to interpret statutes so as to serve the
purpose for which they were created. Purposivism is closely associated in
the United States with Professors Hart and Sacks and their Legal Process
approach to law,21 but its roots lie in the Mischief Rule stated by Lord
Coke in Heydon's Case.2 2 Like intentionalism, purposivism is nonfoundationalist because it, too, permits courts to look beyond the statutory text.
Meaning is found in external sources, like legislative history, that illuminate a statute's purpose. 23 In the United States, both intentionalists and
textualists criticize this approach. Their criticisms include concerns that
purposivism is based on unrealistically optimistic assumptions about the
legislative process, 24 and that it provides courts with too much discre-

tionary power. 25
These three approaches do not exhaust the interpretive methods of
U.S. lawyers. 2 6 For example, prominent U.S. legal scholars have urged a
practical reasoning approach to interpretation. This approach would
Time and again, having found the statutory text plain on its face, opinions nonetheless
consider evidence outside the text. In practice judges are likely to examine text and
extrinsic materials together, treating use of extrinsic evidence relative to the text as
presenting a question of credibility and not of competence. Justice Holmes states the
working reality:. "It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a
rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
HURST, supra note 15, at 56 (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S.

41,48 (1928)).
20 The difference between a strictly textual and a contextual approach to interpretation was
the subject of strong debate within the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Marshall, 908 F2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), affd sub nom., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453 (1991). Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, stated that no applicable rule of statutory construction 'Justifies disregarding unambiuous [statutory] language." Id. at 1318. Judge

Posner dissented and urged "a pragmatist's view' in which judges may "enrich positive law with
the moral values and practical concerns of civilized society." 1d. at 1335.

21 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 332-33.
22 3 Co. Rep. 7a (1584) (rprintedin 76 E.R. 637).
23 In a leading purposivist decision, Justice Brennan relied on legislative history, principally
floor debates, to identify the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. United Steelworkers of Am. v.Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979).
24 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 334-35; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIING THE REGULATORY STATE 137-38 (1990).
25 For a particularly strong critique of purposivism, see the dissenting opinion of Justice
Rehnquist in United Steehooikers, 443 U.S. at 254 (criticizing the majority for refusing to recognize
the intent of Congress as demonstrated by the traditional sources of statutory text and legislative
history, and relying instead on the "'spirit' of the Act").

26 For example, another approach has been labelled dynamic interpretationism. This app roach is controversial because in certain circumstances it would abandon the principle of legislative supremacy and permit judicial updating of statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322 (1989), where Professor Eskridge states:
Dynamic interpretation is most often appropriate in three situations: when there has
been a material change in circumstances between the date of enactment and the date
of application, when the legislature has compromised its original policy in subsequent
statutes, or when new meta-policies have overtaken original legislative expectations.
For examples of dynamic interpretations by courts, which ignored the directives and expectations of the enacting legislatures and gave meanings to statutes strongly grounded in legal developments that occurred long after enactment, see United States v. Tforida E. Coast Railway, 410
U.S. 224 (1973) (defining the type of ruemaking hearing required by the Interstate Commerce
Act), and National Petmleum Refiners Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Commission, 482 E2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(broadly construing the rulemaking authority delegated by the Trade Commission Act).
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employ all three interpretive methods in an effort to discern the best legal answer to each interpretive question. 2 7 U.S. statutory interpretation
is remarkably untidy because litigants cannot be sure whether courts will
pursue one interpretive approach or another in a particular case. Even a
court that seems committed to pursuing a particular interpretive approach in one case may be willing to adopt, without notice, a competing
approach for the next case. 28
B. EnglishRules of Statutory Interpretation
The varied U.S. approaches to statutory interpretation are often contrasted with English rules of statutory interpretation. 29 The conventional
U.S. view has been that English statutory interpretation is far clearer
than U.S. statutory interpretation because English legal tradition prohibited courts from using legislative history to interpret statutes. 30 Pepperrestates the old rule in this manner: "Under present law, there is a general
rule that references to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory construction is [sic] not permissible (the exclusionary rule)."31
However, Pepper recognized that even the traditional rule of exclusion did have an important and longstanding exception. This exception
permitted the use of legislative materials only for identifying "the mischief which the statute intended to cure," and not for "discovering the
meaning of the words used by Parliament to effect such cure."3 2 Thus,
27 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 353; see also POPKIN, supranote 7, at 126, 175-77
(describing interpretive approach of late twentieth century pragmatists).
28 For example, see Caminettiv. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), and United States v. American. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), which support contrary approaches to statutory interpretation. ProfessorJordan has presented a similar criticism of English approaches to statutory
interpretation, contending that courts may decide to pursue any of three other, different a
proaches to interpretation: the literal rule, the golden
or the mischief rule. See William S.
Jordan, III, Legilative History and Statutory Interpretation:rule,
The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.E
L. REv. 1, 6 (1994) ("There is no overarching rule to determine which of these three [ap
proaches] is to be followed in a particular case." (footote omitted)).
29 See HURsT, supra note 15, at 54 ("To one accustomed to the pragmatic flexibility with
which courts in the United States use materials extrinsic to the statute books the English rule
seems at first rigid, doctrinaire, and possibly a cloak for judges' distaste for acknowledging the
supremacy of Parliament.").
30 See, for example, Baade, supra note 10, at 1084, who presents what had been the American understanding of the English rule: "The English no-recourse [to legislative history] rule had
ceased to prevail in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century." See also
Baker, supra note 11, at 353 ("Reference to Hansard or the purpose of ascertaining the intention
of Parliament has been firmly forbidden, both by common law and by rulings of the House of
Commons, for over two centuries."); Gordon Bale, ParliamentaryDebates and Statutory Interpretation: Switching on the Light or Rummaging in the Ashcans of the LegislativeProcess,74 CANADIAN B. REV.
1, 3 (1995) ("This decision [in Pepper] finally modified the exclusionary rule which prohibited
recourse to parliamentary debates in interpreting a statute, a rule which had held sway, with several notable lapses, for more than two hundred years."); Jordan, supra note 28, at 12 (explaining
that legal practitioners and commentators in the United States have an inaccurate "impression
that English courts prohibit consideration of all materials that are comparable to American legislative history").
31 [1993] 1 All E.R. at 60.
32 Id. at 61. Professor Hurst explains this exception as follows: English courts "will take account of facts of history properly subject to judicial notice, to show what general circumstances
existed to bring about a statute." HURsr, supranote 15, at 54; see alsoJordan, supranote 28, at 13
(summarizing scope of the exception to England's exclusionary rule).

1999

Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation

for almost a century, English courts had allowed the use of legislative history, in the forms of reports of commissioners and white papers,3 3 to determine the purpose of legislation 34 but not the intended meaning of the
statutory text. 35 English commentators have suggested that, by carving
out this exception to the English exclusionary rule, purposivism laid the
groundwork for the intentionalist interpretive approach adopted in
Pepper.36 Indeed, the English law of statutory interpretation changed
dramatically when the House of Lords decided Pepper.37

This exception to the exclusionary rule had its source in the mischief rule established by
Heydon' Cas See Bale, supra note 30, at 5 ("Heydon's Case does not condone a mere contextual
analysis of the words of a statute to infer its meaning, rather it commands a purposive approach
with the use of extrinsic aids to determine the true intent of the makers of the statute."). See also
Styles, supra note 11, at 152, describing how the English approach to the mischief rule has
evolved:
Since the war however, and in particular following on the recommendations of the Law
Commission's report, The Interpretationof Statutes in 1969, the 'purposive' approach has
been increasingly favored by the British courts. Under the purposive approach, which
is really a development of the old mischief rule, the courts construe statutes in the light
of the overall purpose of the legislation rather than relying solely on the mere text of
the statute.
Heydon's Casewas, of course, the source of the American approach to purposivism. See supra
text accompanying note 22.
33 One commentator has compared these parliamentary sources to congressional committee reports. SeeJordan, supranote 28, at 13.
34 One commentator has suggested that English courts need not have looked to materials
beyond the statutory text to discern the purpose of legislation. See Baker, supra note 11, at 356
("The question is not whether the approach to interpretation is or should be purposive, which is
not disputed, but how the purpose behind a document may properly and logically be established.").
35 Traditional English law of interpretation thus accepted in a fundamental way the distinction between purposivism and intentionalism, and made the application of an important rule of
interpretation turn on that distinction. Professor Dickerson also made this distinction in his writing on statutory interpretation. See DICKERSON, supra note 11, at 88 ("[I]n general legal usage
the word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate purpose that the statute is intended to
directly express and immediately accomplish, whereas the word 'purpose' refers primarily to an
ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish."). But cf.NMIA & LANE, supra note 13, at 8 ("Whether or not a real distinction exists between legislative intent or purpos other than that made in the historical context, courts have
basically ignored this debate in the search for statutory meaning.").
36 See Bale, supra note 30, at 17 ("A number of reasons combined to bring about the demise
of the exclusionary rule. Perhaps the most important is the move toward a purposive approach
to statutory interpretation that has gained momentum in Britain in the last four decades."); id.at
17-18 ("Admitting these extrinsic aids [Reports of Royal Commissions, Law Commission Reports
and White Papers] while excluding the sometimes more relevant parliamentary debates became
logically indefensible."); Styles, supranote 11, at 152 ("[A] purposive approach seems to assume
that the purpose of a statute can be ascertained in some way independent of the text of the Act itself,
and therefore implies that courts should consult extra-statutory materials in order to discover the
purpose of the legislation in question.").
37 [1993] 1 All E.R. at 42. Because of its significance, Pepper was selected as a lead case for
the second edition of a principal casebook on statutory interpretation. See Eskridge & Frickey,
supranote 3, at 758.
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III. THE PEPPERV HARTDECISION AND THE LIMITED ADOPTION
OF INTENTIONALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart
Pepper involved a dispute over how to calculate the value of an inhouse fringe benefit to taxpayers. The issue was whether the statutory
text, which required that the value of the benefit be equal to the
"amount of any expense incurred in or in connection with" 38 providing
the fringe benefit, meant "the marginal cost caused by the provision of
the benefit in question or a proportion of the total cost incurred in providing the service both for the public and for the employee (the average
cost)."39 Resolution of the issue was important to the taxpayers because
they had received the fringe benefit of free tuition for their children,
who were occupying surplus places at the school. 40 The marginal cost of
educating these students was minimal, while the average cost was consid1
erable. 4
Initially, the House of Lords decided that the statutory text dictated
the use of average cost valuation. 42 Following rehearing, however, the
House of Lords decided that the relevant statutory text was ambiguous
and obscure and, accordingly, permitted reference to legislative history
to ascertain the text's meaning.43 Having considered the legislative history, the House of Lords decided that the value of the fringe benefit
must be based on the marginal cost to the employer.44 By using the legislative history in this way, the House of Lords rejected its longstanding
exclusionary rule. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that the new rule
would be the following:
[R]eference to parliamentary materials should be permitted as
an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or
obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in court to parliamentary materials should only be permitted where such material clearly
discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying
behind the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee
that any statement other than the statement of the minister or
other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these criteria.45

38 Finance Act, 1976, § 63(2) (Eng.).
39 Pepper,[1993] 1 All E.R. at 69.
40 See id, at 53.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 52 (referring to rehearing and fact that three Lord Justices agreed with the
Revenue Department's reading of the statute).
43 See id.at 54-55.
44 See i. at 71.

45 Id. at 64.
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This change in the exclusionary rule presents a clear acceptance of
the intentionalist approach to interpretation in some circumstances. 46 Lord Browne-Wilkinson sought to limit those circumstances by
requiring that two tests be met before legislative history could be considered. 47 The first test requires the statutory text to be either ambiguous,
obscure, or absurd, and therefore faulty. The second requires the legislative history to be from a reliable and knowledgeable source and that it
clearly demonstrate legislative intent. Lord Browne-Wilkinson prescribed these limitations expressly to avoid the significant problems he
perceived in U.S. statutory interpretation. He stated: "Experience in the
United States of America, where legislative history has for many years
been much more generally admissible than I am now suggesting, shows
how important it is to maintain strict control over the use of such material.48
B. Pepper and the Strength of the Threshold Requirements
Pepper itself provides important insights into the significance of each
threshold requirement and its likelihood of ensuring "strict control over
the use of' legislative history.49 The faulty text requirement assumes that
courts will be foundationalist in interpreting statutes and that opportunities for resort to legislative history will be limited. 5 0 Because, in the
House of Lords' view, "Parliament never intends to enact an ambiguity,"51 the statutory text is likely to be faulty in only "a few cases,"5 2 and
46 See Styles, supranote 11, at 153, arguing that
This approach [in Pepper] takes the courts beyond a purposive approach, in the sense
of discovering what mischief the measure is aimed at, towards an 'intentionalist' approach where the 'intention' of Parliament, and hence the construction of a statute, is
determined simply by referring to the appropriate authoritative statement laid down by
the Act's promoter ....
Id
47 One commentator has argued that, in view of the broad rationale that the House of
Lords presented to support reference to Hansard, the limitations identified by House of Lords
were "arbitrary." Dawn Oliver, Comment, Pepper v. Hart: A suitable casefor reference to Hansard?,
1993 PUB. L. 5, 9 ("The limits set are, it is suggested, arbitrary. If the principle of purposive construction on which the relaxation of the rule is based were to be applied generally, reference to
Hansardwould be far more widely permitted.").
48 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R at 67. Lord Browne-Wilkinson believed that the experience of
New Zealand and Australia, which had previously abandoned the English exclusionary rule,
showed that intentionalist interpretations could be limited to rare cases. See id. at 66-67. A brief
history of the abandonment of the exclusionary rule in these nations is presented in Bale, supra
note 30, at 23-24. As that history shows, Lord Browne-Wflkinson may have exaggerated the narrow scope of the exception to the exclusionary rule in New Zealand and Australia. See id. at 23
("In 1984, Australia modified the exclusionary rule by statute for Commonwealth legislation. Any extrinsic material capable of ascertaining the meaning of a provision may now be considered to confirm the ordinary meaning or to determine the meaning where the provision is
ambiguous, obscure or leads to an absurdity"); id. ("New Zealand has apparently achieved a similar result to that in Australia but through judicial rather than legislative reform."); see also Francis
Bennion, Hansard-Helpor Hindrance?A Draftsman's Vew of Pepper v. Hart, 14 STATUTE L. REV.
149, 156-59 (1993) (reviewing the history of the exclusionary rule in Australia, New Zealand and
Canada).
49 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R at 67.
50 This foundationalism would be the same as the foundationalism of the United States's
textualist approach described supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
51 Pepper, [1993]1 All E.R at 64.
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resort to legislative history accordingly will be rare. Judges in the United
States would likely disagree with Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion that
faulty texts are likely to be encountered in only a few cases. The Supreme Court remarked recently that "most statutes are ambiguous to
some degree." 53 Indeed, Lord Justice Griffiths made a similar point in
his separate opinion in Pepper "The ever-increasing volume of legislation
must inevitably result in ambiguities of statutory language which are not
perceived at the time the legislation is enacted." 54 Professor Jordan has
presented the provocative view that, because of differences between the
legislative processes in the two nations, "the irreducible minimum [of
ambiguity] in American legislation is far higher than the irreducible
minimum in England."55 In sum, although Lord Browne-Wilkinson may
have been naive about the precision of statutory text, many saw his faulty
text requirement was therefore seen as important in limiting extra litigation costs-costs that might result from a nonfoundationalist, U.S. approach to legislation that permits legislative history to trump a clear
meaning of statutory text.
Such a concern about the impact of nonfoundationalism in the
United States undoubtedly is well grounded. In many instances, the U.S.
Supreme Court has declined to give effect to clear statutory text because
it was convinced that the clear text did not reflect Congress's plain intent
or purpose, as shown by the legislative history. In Train v. ColoradoPublic
Interest Research Group,56 the Supreme Court held that a court may rely on
legislative history to construe a statute even when the statute's language
is clear on its face. 57 The Court then relied on the legislative history to
conclude that the statutory term "radioactive materials," which was included in the Clean Water Act as a specific example of a type of "pollutant,"58 did not include radioactive materials regulated by the Atomic
Energy Commission. This reading of the statute was supported by the
relevant congressional committee reports. 59 The Court rejected the textualist approach, which would have found any radioactive materials to be
pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Water Act:
[R] eliance on the "plain meaning" of the words "radioactive materials" contained in the definition of "pollutant" in the [Clean
52 Id.
53 Muscarello v.United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998). See also Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretationinthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983), arguing
that
The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not that
they are poorly drafted-though many are-and not that the legislators failed to agree
on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute-though often they do fail-but
that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance of and with imperfect application for
the problems that will be encountered in, its application.
54 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 49-50.
55 Jordan, supra note 28, at 32; see also id. at 39-41 (describing social differences between
the American and English judiciary that "may reduce perceived ambiguity in England").
56 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
57 See id at 10 (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
58 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1970 ed. Supp. IV).
59 See426 U.S. at 11-23.
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Water Act] contributes little to our understanding of whether
Congress intended the Act to encompass the regulation of
source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials. To have included these materials under the [Act] would have marked a significant alteration of the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied
in the [Atomic Energy Act]. Far from containing the clear indication of legislative intent that we might expect before recognizing such a change in policy, the legislative history reflects, on
balance, an intention to preserve the pre-existing regulatory
plan. 60
An even more frequently mentioned example of the Supreme
Court's willingness to ignore the clear meaning of a statutory text is
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.61 There, the Court ignored the
broad scope of a statutory prohibition that had several specific, welldefined exceptions and concluded that the statutory prohibition on employment contracts did not apply to the employment contract of a clergyman. Even though none of the statutory exceptions applied, the
Court decided that the purpose of the statute, as shown by the legislative
history, was to prohibit only certain types of employment contracts, and a
contract with a clergyman was outside of that purpose. 62 Neither of
these interpretations would have been possible if U.S. statutory interpretation had precluded the Court from considering the legislative history
when the statutory text was clear.
Because legislative history can be decisive in U.S. courts, U.S. lawyers
seek to make the strongest nonfoundational argument possible based on
intent or purpose whenever the statutory text is adverse to the position
of their client. Moreover, the careful litigator, unsure of the interpretive
approach the court will take in deciding any case, must make the strongest possible argument based on text and intent and purpose in order to
give clients the best possible representation. This approach to litigating
statutory cases greatly increases the cost of representation, because lawyers must research not only the relevant statutory text, but also its legislative history, to develop the best case for their client.63

60 Id. at 23-24 (citation and footnote omitted); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct.
939 (1989) (concluding that reviewing courts are bound to follow interpretations of statutory
text made in lower court attorneys fees decisions because those decisions were cited in congressional committee reports).
61 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
62 Id. at 463-65.
63 Dickerson states:

[A] court should be careful not to use [legislative history sources] so as to make them
an element in predicting the outcome of specific litigation. Otherwise, the resulting
responsibility of the lawyer to his clients to make a relatively unproductive search
among these materials would continue to make statutory interpretation a disproportionately costily and time-consuming operation.
DICKERSON, supra note 11, at 195-96.

Furthermore, Hurst states:
[C] osts in time and money preclude lawyers from looking past the text to search transcripts of committee hearings or committee reports every time they must advise clients

of their rights or duties under a statute. Ready resort to legislative history may increase
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The U.S. experience demonstrates that, if limiting litigation costs is a
desirable goal, there is good reason to define a threshold requirement
limiting the use of legislative history. Pepper, however, demonstrates the
difficulty of defining meaningful requirements. Its first requirement is
that the statutory text be faulty-that is, ambiguous, absurd, or obscure-before a court can consider legislative history.64 A leading
American textualist has suggested that courts have a great deal of latitude in deciding whether language is ambiguous. 65 This same point was
made by Lord Justice Oliver in Pepper "Ingenuity can sometimes suggest

ambiguity or obscurity where none exists in fact."66 It appears that this is
exactly what happened in Pepper.
The Pepper opinions, in the Court of Appeal and in the House of
Lords, show that the judges initially found the statutory text to have a
clear meaning. The House of Lords viewed the statutory text as faulty
only after the proffer of legislative history showing that Parliament had
not intended what the judges had previously understood to be the plain
and clear meaning of the text. Recall that the interpretive issue in Pepper
was how to value an in-house fringe benefit. The parties disputed
whether the statutory text, which stated that the value of the benefit was
equal to the "amount of any expense incurred in or in connection with"
providing the fringe benefit, 67 meant "the marginal cost caused by the
provision of the benefit in question or a proportion of the total cost incurred in providing the service both for the public and for the employee
(the average cost)."68
The Court of Appeal decision, which included lengthy opinions by
two judges, presented the textualist interpretation of the definition.
Lord Justice Nicholls concluded that the statutory text required that the
tax benefit be based on "the amount of the expense incurred by the employer in providing the benefit," rather than on the marginal cost to the
employer of filling seats that otherwise would have been vacant. 69 Lord
Justice Slade agreed with the lower court's opinion that the "interpretation of [the text's] effect is inescapable." 70 Both of these opinions present the text as having a clear, determinate, indeed "inescapable"
meaning.
When the House of Lords initially considered Pepper, it, too, viewed
the text as unambiguous. Three of the five panel members of the House
the effects of unequal resources among contending parties; wealthy clients can better
afford to pay for lawyers' time in searching beyond the statute books....
HURST, supra note 15, at 54-55 (footnote omitted).
64 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 64.
65 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 62 ("[T]he court may choose when to declare the language of the statute 'ambiguous.' There is no metric for clarity.").
66 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 52.
67 Finance Act, 1976, § 63(2) (Eng.).
68 Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 69.
69 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1991] 2 All E.R. 824, 829 (Eng. CA).
70 Id. at 833. Lord Justice Slade reached this conclusion notwithstanding his expressed
"misgivings" about the impact the interpretation would have on taxpayers receiving in-house
benefits. Id.
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of Lords concurred with the Court of Appeal's view that the text dictated
an average cost approach to determining the value of in-house fringe
benefits. Lord Justices Bridge,71 Oliver,72 and Browne-Wilkinson reached
this conclusion. 73 These Lord Justices must have viewed the text as unambiguous because, in the case of ambiguity, they presumably would
have taken the same approach as Lord Justice Mackay in the rehearing
and applied the substantive canon favoring taxpayers when a revenue
statute is ambiguous. 74
Pepper itself thus illustrates how the faulty text requirement may be
manipulated by judges wishing to follow what they believe to be the intent of Parliament rather than the meaning of the text. Although the
House of Lords asserted that it insists upon a foundationalist approachthat is, only the text may be considered when deciding whether the statute is faulty-the court rejected its initial view that the text was determinative only after it was informed of the contradictory legislative
history. This is not the approach of a foundationalist, who would condemn an interpretive approach that rejected the determinate meaning
of text in favor of another meaning discernible only in the legislative history.
The House of Lords nevertheless indicated that it would not wholly
abandon the foundationalist primacy of text. Two Lord Justices indicated that they would decline to hold that a statute had a meaning that
conflicted with its text, regardless of the Parliamentary materials supporting such an interpretation.75 Lord Justice Bridge, while acknowledging that the text required the tax benefit to be determined based on
average cost if "construed by conventional criteria,"76 rejected that
"technical rule of construction requiring me to ignore the very material
which in this case indicates unequivocally which of two possible interpretations ...was intended by Parliament." 77 Meanwhile, Lord Justice Griffiths set down his basic interpretive rule as follows: "The object of the
court in interpreting legislation is to give effect so far as the languagepermits to the intention of the legislature." 8 For these Lord Justices, the intentionalist approach is permitted only when the resulting interpretation
conforms to some possible reading of the text.79 This failsafe rule closely
71 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R, at 49 (stating that he agreed with the Court of Appeals in-

terpretation, if the statute were "construed by conventional criteria").
72 See id.
at 52.
73 See id at 53.
74 See id at 47.
75 This quasifoundationalism would presumably have foreclosed the interpretations of the

U. S. Supreme Court in the cases discussed supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
76 Pepper,[1993]1 All E.R. at49.
77 Id. (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).

79 Compare the following statement by Bale:
Finally, counsel by wisely arguing for only limited modification of the exclusionary rule

finessed the rule of law requirement that the statute book must remain a reliable guide

to the citizen. Hansard will only be consulted when legislation is ambiguous, obscure
or leads to an absurdity. The courts as interpreters will still be confined by the text but
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resembles the Hart and Sacks rules of purposivist interpretation, which
bar any interpretation that the words of the statute could not bear.8 0
That limitation may be ignored by U.S. courts when they engage in purposivist interpretations.8 1
The second threshold requirement prescribed in Pepper is that the
legislative history must demonstrate the clearly signified intent of Parliament. The language must be unambiguous and presented by a source
with a reliable pedigree. The application of the latter requirement, at
least, should be straightforward in England because of its parliamentary
form of government and reliance on the party whip.8 2 "[T ] he fusion at
the top between the executive and legislative branches that exists in England" should result in legislative materials which reveal the intent of the
83
governing party.
The House of Lords decided that the legislative history in Peppermet
the clearly signified intent requirement because, in presenting the legislation, a Ministry official had informed Parliament that the bill had been
amended to ensure that in-house fringe benefits would be taxed based
on their marginal costs to the employer rather than on the basis of the
84
average cost.

The legislative history relied upon in Pepperplainly met the reliability
requirement. Therefore, the case does not yield much insight into the
problems that may arise in ensuring that the legislative history is reliable. The U.S. experience with intentionalist interpretation provides
grounds for real concerns about reliability. U.S. courts consider all varieties of legislative history but apply a sliding scale to test the reliability of
such materials.8 5 Advocates in U.S. courts often will include all sorts of
in the case of ambiguity they will not be confined to it. The appropriate separation of
powers between parliament and the courts will be preserved.
Bale, supra note 30, at 18 (suggesting that this limitation on intentionalism "finessed" the rule of
law concerns that would otherwise have confronted the House of Lords) (citation omitted).
80 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at 332 (summarizing the rules of Hart and Sacks
purposivism).
81 See, e.g, BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (narrowly construing definition of organizations eligible for tax exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3)); Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (discussed supranote 61 and accompanying text).
82 See Baker, supra note 11, at 356 ("It is, of course, a notorious fact that while a government
remains in power it may whip in a majority of members of the House of Commons to vote in favor of its Bills."). See genera!y Jordan, supra note 28, at 21-28 (describing differences between
Parliament and Congress, particularly that, "[iun England, the Executive has virtually complete
control of the legislature" through leadership of the I-louse of Commons and strong party discipline).
83 DICKERSON, supra note 11, at 172; seeStyles, supra note 11, at 157 ("All commentators are
agreed that the control of Parliament by the government of the day, through the party whip system, patronage and the uses of the Royal prerogatives, has resulted in the overwhelming subservience of the legislature to the executive in this country."). See also discussion infra notes 91-96
and accompanying text regarding the difference in governmental forms and the implications of
that difference.
84 SeePepper,[1993] 1 All E.R. at 57-60.
85 Compare Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("The most authoritative form of such [contemporaneous legislative] explanation is a congressional report defining the scope and meaning of proposed legislation. The most authoritative
report is a Conference Report acted upon by both 1ouses ....), and United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979) (relying on floor debate statements to discern pur-
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supportive legislative history to argue their preferred interpretation of a
statute. The effect of this approach is, in the view of one distinguished
U.S. judge, largely equivalent to "looking over a crowd and picking out
your friends" (i.e., the favorable legislative history), and then inferring
that the crowd is friendly (i.e., construing the statute in accordance with
that select history).86 However, because the English and U.S. political
systems differ significantly and because Pepper imposed its reliability requirement, English courts are unlikely to consider the range of sources
of legislative history that U.S. courts review to discern legislative intent.
The strong executive leadership of Parliament produces less variety of
legislative materials, and the Pepper pedigree requirement drastically limits the admissibility of these sources.
C. Pepper and Legislative Supremacy
Perhaps the strongest argument articulated in Pepperto justify intentionalist interpretations in limited cases is that the decision promotes
legislative supremacy. 7 The House of Lords decided that intentionalism
is proper in certain cases because it enables the court to interpret the law
as the legislature intended.8 8 Intentionalists in the United States present
this same argument.8 9 However, a different group of U.S. commentators
would likely predict that the willingness of the House of Lords to permit
intentionalist interpretations will shift power to the judiciary at the expense of the legislature because intentionalism allows courts to avoid the
meaning of clear text.90
Differences between the ways laws are made in Congress and in Parliament have given rise to a criticism of intentionalism not heard in the
United States. Because the government (that is, the majority party) has
control over reliable legislative history in the English system, 9 1 critics
pose and intent of legislation); Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988)
("This Court does not usually accord much weight to the statements of a bill's opponents.").
86 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 733-34 (quoting report of the comments of
Court of AppealsJudge Harold Leventhal).
87 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R1 at 73-74; see also HURST, supra note 29 (quoting Professor
Hurst's view that the traditional English exclusionary rule may conflict with legislative supremacy); Bale, supra note 30, at 12 ("[The traditional exclusionary] rule enhanced the ability of the
court to check the power of parliament and that of a cabinet which dominates parliament
through party discipline."); id. at 28 ("[I]f after earnest study of a statute ambiguity remains, resort to Hansard would seem to be not merely appropriate but mandatory because parliamentary
supremacy, except as modified by the Charter,is the grundnorm of our system of government.");
cf Styles, supra note 11, at 155 ("Henceforth anyjudge who disregards an authoritative statement
will be open to the accusation that he is thwarting the democratic will of Parliament.").
88 See Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 64.
89 See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 253 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Our task in this case, like any
other case involving the construction of a statute, is to give effect to the intent of Congress."); id.
at 231 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[N]othing short of a thorough examination of the
congressional debates will fully expose the magnitude of the Court's misinterpretation of Congress' intent.").
90 See supra notes 12-13; cf.Jordan, supranote 28, at 28 ("American courts have the power
to emphasize one aspect of legislative history over another in reaching their decisions.").
91 One commentator has challenged Peppes requirement that legislative history have a reliable pedigree before it can form the basis for an intentionalist interpretation, because that requirement is "unduly pro-government:
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have claimed that Pepper will shift power to the government and away
from the Parliament, as a legislative, deliberative body that enacts written
law.9 2 Putting a distinctly American construction on this English criticism, one could claim that the use of legislative history in England results in a Chevron-type deference to the government's pre-enactment
interpretation of a statutory text. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a court must defer to a reasonable, post-enactment interpretation of a statute by an
administrative agency when the statute explicitly or implicitly (through
ambiguity) delegated to the agency the role of interpreter.9 3 This deference to governmental interpretations of ambiguous statutes replaced the
previous interpretive rule, which required court centered decision based
94
solely on the court's interpretation of the meaning of the statutory text.
Continuing with the analogy to Chevron, the previous interpretive rule
might be analogized to a requirement that courts go no further than applying the first part of the Chevron analysis. In that step, a court determines whether Congress has identified a clear meaning in the statute
and, if so, requires that such a meaning apply.95 In sum, unlike the U.S.
cases employing an intentionalist approach, Pepper has been criticized
By confining the permissible parliamentary material to statements by a minister or
other promoter of the Bill, the Law Lords appeared to give an unduly proIt might have been advisable to have held that
making.
twist
to their
governmental
Hansard can be
resorted
tolaw
when
the legislation
is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to
an absurdity-leaving the weight accorded the material to the wisdom and judgment
of the judicial interpreter.
Bale, supranote 30, at 26.
92 See Styles, supranote 11, at 157 ("The likely long term effect of Pepperis that the power of
the Government will be increased at the expense of the powers of the courts."); Baker, supra note
11, at 357 ("It took many centuries of constitutional struggle to eliminate the notion that the policy of the government should have the force of law, now, it seems, something very like it is slipping through the back door."); David Miers, Taxing Perks and InterpringStatutes: Pepper v. Hart,
56 MODERN L. REv. 695, 708 (1993) ("[T] here is surely a real danger here of the courts becoming too close to the executive's intentions. It is one thing to give effect to what Parliament has
enacted as law, but quite another to give effect to ministerial statements about what the law
is... .); Oliver, supra note 47, at 13 (asserting that Pppe's abandonment of the exclusionary
rule "may well reinforce the dominance of the government in the constitution and reduce the
power of the courts to act as checks against the dominant executive"); see a/soJordan,supra note
28, at 35 ("Since most legislation [in England] is sponsored by the government, much legislative
history such as ministerial statements or arguments of proponents of legislation, is controlled by
the government. Thejudicial refusal to consider this sort of material has served, to some extent,
as a check on excessive government power.").
93 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
94 See Miers, supranote 92, at 702 ("[T]he corollary... that what Parliament says (at least in
the form of primary legislation) goes, is that it is only the judiciary and no other person, who has
the authority, finally and compellingly, to say what those laws mean.");Jordan, supra note 28, at
27-28 ("[The pre-Pepper English approach] arguably grants more power to the courts by freeing
them to make decisions without regard to what might be drawn from relatively unclear legislative
history."); Styles, supra note 11, at 158 (arguing that, as a result of the Pepperdecision, "[the
courts will have surrendered their power of interpretingstatutes and substituted it with the mere
power of applyingstatutes").
95 467 U.S. at 842-43. Members of the Supreme Court have, of course, differed on the
question of whether this first-step determination should be based only on text or on legislative intent, including consideration of legislative history. See id at 843 & n.9 (requiring court to "give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," with intent to be "ascertain[ed]' by
.employing traditional tools of statutory construction"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Chewvron's first-step analysis should be based
only on statutory text).
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because it shifts lawmaking power away from both96 court and legislature
and toward the government, that is, the executive.
Several later cases applied the new rules that Pepper prescribed for
the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes. These cases show
that Pepperhas had more than the limited impact on statutory interpreta97
tion in England than the House of Lords had anticipated.
IV. THE EFFECT OF PEPPERV. HART. HAS STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN ENGLAND BEEN AMERICANIZED?98
A. The Threshold Requirement of a Faulty Text
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion, one may reference
parliamentary materials only when the statutory text is faulty as a result
of ambiguity, obscurity, or absurdity. As a threshold matter, the faulty
text requirement has provided the basis for the Supreme Court's promulgation of a practice direction. 9 9 The direction requires that any party
"intend[ing] to refer to the reports of parliamentary proceedings" (the
Hansard reports) must "serve upon all other parties and the court copies
of any ...

extract together with a brief summary of the argument in-

tended to be based upon such extract."100 Service of the Hansard extract
and summary of the argument must be made at least five working days
before the hearing.101 At the very least, this practice direction indicates
that English courts view the use of Hansard in statutory interpretation as
reserved for special cases.

96 See Miers, supra note 92, at 706, stating that:
As Pepper v. Hartgives the government the opportunity to say in other words what the
legal effect of a clause is to be, there will be an incentive to use the opportunity whenever some particularly difficult piece of legislation is to be debated, as a way of increasing the chances that the courts will interpret the section as the government wishes.
See also Styles, supra note 11, at 157 ("Indeed it is likely that ministers will start as a matter of policy to spell out the meaning of legislation as it comes before Parliament in order to ensure that
the courts interpret the legislation in a manner approved by the Government.").
97 Commentators predicted that Pepper would have a much broader effect on statutory interpretation than the House of Lords expected. See Oliver, supra note 47, at 10 ("Despite Lord
Browne-Wilkinson's tightly drawn limitations on reference to Hansard, it is probable that the
courts will experience difficulties in holding the line against pressures to extend the circumstances in which Hansardmay be called in aid, because the case legitimates reliance on the principal [sic] of purposive construction."); Styles, supra note 11, at 156 ("[Lord Browne-WMilkinson]
may underestimate the number of authoritative statements which can be found in Hansard").
98 Several courts in England have concluded that the three threshold requirements identified in Pepper before resort to legislative history is permitted simply have no applicability when
the court is interpreting the meaning of European Community directives. These courts have
held that the traditional exclusionary rule never applied to such cases. See Three Rivers Dist.
Council v. Bank of England (No. 2), [1996] 2 All E.R. 363 (Q.B.) (holding that Peppeds rules on
admissibility do not apply when the issue relates to the broad statutory purpose rather than the
meaning of a particular provision or when the legislation involved is intended to implement a
European directive.); see also British Sugar, plc. v.James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [1996] R.C. 281
(Ch.); U v.W, [1996] Transcript: VWason &Assoc. (Fain.).
99 Practice Note, [1995] 1 All E.R. 234 (S. CL).
100 Id.
101 Id at 235.
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With regard to the application of the faulty text requirement, we
have already discussed the fundamental problem with Pepper's threshold
requirement-there is no generally accepted standard for clarity; therefore, determining whether a text is ambiguous or obscure often is controversial. 102 This problem is illustrated by the House of Lords decision
in Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. B.M.. (No. 3) Ltd.1O3 There, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, through a process of close reading and reasoning,
concluded that the statutory text had a determinate meaning. The issue
was whether, for purposes of capital allowances for fixtures, "the machinery or plant belongs" to the taxpayer.104 Lord Browne-Wilkinson
concluded that the meaning was forced by the "clear words" of the text
and that "an anomalous result" would follow from a contrary interpretation that the equipment at issue belonged to the taxpayer.105 Nevertheless, in the very next paragraph of his opinion, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
stated that he "accept[s] that the language of [the statute] is ambiguous
and obscure" and that the court may therefore refer to legislative history
to discern its true intent. 106 If that history had demonstrated that the
legislature had intended something other than the meaning of the "clear
words" of the text, Lord Browne-Wilkinson presumably would have followed that nontextual intent. This is hardly the interpetive method of a
foundationalist court.
Several other cases also have undercut the foundationalism of English statutory interpretation. In these cases, the courts considered the
legislative history proffered to them, even though these courts found the
statutory text clear on its face and unambiguous. 107 However, the significance of these cases should not be overstated because the courts decided
that the legislative history was either inconclusive or confirmed the plain
meaning of the text.
Several cases illustrate this approach.108 In Regina v. Warwickshire
County Council,109 the House of Lords considered the meaning of section
20(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. The issue was whether that
provision, which made it unlawful to provide consumers with misleading
information about prices "in the course of business," applied to an employee of a retailer." 0 Lord Roskill, who wrote the decision, focused on
the statutory text, concluding "that the words 'in the course of any busi102 See supranotes 65-66 and accompanying text.
103 [1995] 3W.LR. 630 (H.L.).
104 Finance Act, 1971, § 44(1) (Eng.).
105 [1995] 3 W.L.R. at 645.
106 Id.
107 See Miers, supranote 92, at 705-06 (summarizing House of Lords decisions where Hansard was used to confirm plain meaning of the text).
108 Other examples of this approach include National Rivers Authority v. Yorkshire Water
Services Ltd., [1995] 1 All E.R. 225, 233 (H.L.); McDonald v. Graham, [1994] R.P.C. 407, 433-35
(Eng. CA); Avon County Council v. Hooper, [1997] 1 All E.R. 532 (Eng. CA); and Busby v. Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., [1994] 1 E.G.L.R. 136, 138 (County Court). Cf Regina v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth. ex pane Blood, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1176, 1190 (Q.B.) (reviewing legislative history "put before the court with the consent of both parties").
109 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 1 (H.L.).
110 Id. at5.
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ness of his must mean any business of which the defendant is either the
owner or in which he has a controlling interest."lll Notwithstanding this
determinate meaning, Lord Roskill proceeded to discuss the legislative
history of this provision, which included a statement by the minister that
the statute was drafted to ensure that only the employer would be subject
to liability.112 This use of legislative history to confirm that the text
means what it says closely resembles the United States' nonfoundationalist approach to interpretation.1n 3 Indeed, the court's willingness to consider the legislative history in this case is notable because the rule of
leniency to criminal defendants should have given the defendant the
benefit of any statutory doubt.
Other courts have taken this approach as well. In British &_ Commonwealth Holdings, plc v. Barclays Bank, p1c,114 the Court of Appeal decided
1
that the relevant text of the Companies Act of 1985 was unambiguous. 15
Nevertheless, it discussed the legislative history as "coincid [ing] with" the
meaning of the text.11 6 Finally, in Building Societies Commission v. Halifax
Building Society,"17 Judge Chadwick of the Chancery Division had to interpret the meaning of Section 100(8) of the Building Societies Act
1986. Judge Chadwick was "satisfied that the words 'in priority to other
subscribers' can be given an intelligible meaning.... "118 The judge
nevertheless included a lengthy discussion of the parliamentary debate
that yielded the statutory text, 119 and opined that "there is nothing in the
parliamentary material or in the consultative paper which points to any
other meaning for those words."120 In more recent cases, several courts
have considered legislative materials despite their view that the statutory
text did not meet Peppes faulty text requirement.12 1 The interpretive
approach taken in these cases indicates that the first requirement of Pepper has been weakened. That is, in the event reliable parliamentary materials were to demonstrate an intent that conflicted with the "intelligible

111 Id at 7.
at 7-8.
112 Id.
113 For example, see Chief'Justice Burger's use of legislative history to confirm the meaning
of determinate text in Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,462 U.S. 122, 133-40 (1983), and Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,437 U.S. 153, 177 & n.29 (1978). See also supra note 19 (quoting Profes-

sor Hurst's description of this American approach to interpretation).
114 [1996] 1 All E.R. 381 (Eng. CA).
115 Seeid. at392.
116 Id. at 393.
117 [1995] 3AIIE.R. 193 (Ch.).
118 Id.
at 210.
119 Seeid. at207-09.
120 Id.at 210. For other cases that take this interpretive approach, see Cagiar v.Billingham
(Inspector of Taxes), [1996] S.T.C. 150 (Special Commissioner's Decision) and Regina v.Dudley Mag-

istrate's
Court exparteHollis, [1998] 1 Alf E.R 759 (Q.B.).
121 See Regina v. Social Fund Inspector ex parte Harper, CO/1904/96 (Q.B. 1997), in The

Times (London), Mar. 31, 1997; Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Owalabi,
CO/1342/95 (Q.B. 1995), inThe Times (London),Jan. 3, 1996; Ametalco UKv. Inland Revenue
Commissioners, [1996] S.T.C. 399 (Special Commissioner's Decision); Holdings Ltd. v. Money
(Inspector of Taxes), [ 1996] S.T.C. 347 (Special Commissioner's Decision).
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meaning" of the statutory text, English courts would interpret the statute
22
to conform to the actual intent of Parliament.
When the legislative history contradicts the text's meaning, disagreement about whether the statutory text is actually faulty is more
likely to arise. 23 In Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Wilson,124 a majority of
the House of Lords concluded that the statutory text was ambiguous and
25
then relied on parliamentary materials to infer the statute's meaning.1
Lord Lloyd, dissenting, contended that the meaning of the text was clear
26
and that the reference to legislative history accordingly was improper.
Interestingly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not specifically address the
faulty text requirement in his opinion; instead, he may have applied the
failsafe rule of Pepper.127 Because he believed that the legislative history
defined the legislature's intent so clearly, he seemed concerned only that
the statutory text was capable of bearing that meaning.128 He was not
content to give the text its determinate meaning simply because that
meaning was not absurd.
In sum, the failure of foundationalism in English courts, evidenced
by the application of the faulty text requirement in Pepperitself,129 is apparent in cases that have followed Pepper. English courts have become
more intentionalist in their interpretive approach and appear willing to
rely on legislative history to support interpretations that may conflict
with the determinate meaning of the statutory text.
B. The Requirement that the LegislativeHistor)Be Sufficiently Reliable to
DemonstrateIntention
Before considering how the reliability requirement has fared since
Pepperwas decided, it should be noted that this requirement is unlikely
to limit significantly the costs of litigation that result from employing the
122 See Styles, supranote11, at 155, noting that:
If, however, as is now the case, the courts concede that it is legitimate to ascertain the
intention of Parliament by recourse to ministerial statement, ten it becomes difficult
to foresee circumstances in which a court could refuse to follow the interpretation laid
down by the minister. To fail to do so is blatantly to 'disobey' the 'intention' of Parliament.
123 Such disagreements are common in American law. In Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
462 U.S. 122, 141-50 (1983), the dissenters, unlike the majority, viewed the text as ambiguous
and therefore urged that resort to legislative history was necessary to discern the intended meaning. See alsoTennessee ValeyAut,. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 205 (1978) (PowellJ., dissenting) (concluding that the term "actions is ambiguous because it may refer only to actions being
considered by an agency); ef NewJerseyv. NewYork, 118 5. Ct. 1726, 1759-61 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (viewing the terms of nineteenth century interstate compact as ambiguous, while the
majority held that the compact has a clear meaning).
124 [1995]2 All E.R 100 (H.L.).
125 Seeid. at 105-09.
126 Seeid.at 120.
127 This rule is discussed supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128 Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that "[t]he statutory history makes it impossible to hold
that the 'omission' to offer to employees who did not accept the proffered new contracts constituted 'action' against such employees." [1995] 2 All E.R. at 112.
129 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
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intentionalist approach. The reason for this is straightforward: If litigants gain confidence that courts will consider their arguments based on
legislative history-confidence that must in fact be growing based on the
decisions sampled in the previous section-litigators will have to research the legislative history of statutes to determine whether reliable
legislative history that conflicts with the statute's apparent meaning exists. 130 The reliability requirement relates to the court's confidence in
reaching conclusions about the legislature's true intent, but does not
have much bearing on the need to consider the legislative history in the
first instance. That need already is apparent given the English courts'
new nonfoundationalist approach. 131
Given that Pepper's threshold faulty text requirement appears to be
ineffective in limiting judicial consideration of legislative history, Pepper's
reliability requirement may become more important in defining the
situations in which courts may employ nontextual indicia of intent to justify an intentionalist interpretation. Under Pepper, legislative history is
reliable only if it meets two requirements: First, the legislative history
must have a clearly signified intent-that is, clarity. Second, the legislative history must have sufficiently reliable pedigree. This latter requirement has not yet been the subject of significant judicial analysis. Thus
far, courts appear willing to consider only the statements of ministers or
the proponents of the enacted bill.
The clearly signified intent requirement has, however, been the subject of recent decisions by the House of Lords and other courts. In MelluiMsh 32 the House of Lords sought to bolster the clarity requirement by
stating that "the only materials which can properly be introduced [as legislative history] are clear statements made by a minister or other promoter of the Bill directed to the very point in question in the
litigation."133 The only acceptable legislative materials were those "directed to the specific statutory provision under consideration [and] to
the problem raised by the litigation."134 The House of Lords accordingly
declined to consider the statements that ministers had made about other
portions of the statute at issue, stating that a court should not be involved in "the interpretation of the ministerial statement and the question whether anything said in relation to the other provision can have

130 Baker, supra note 11, at 354, explains that, after Pepper.
Every legal adviser, not to mention teachers of law, will be forced when interpreting
statutes to grapple not only with expensive technology but with the troublesome metaphysical problem of assessing in each particular case whether a statement in Hansard
would or would not be admitted in court were the matter to become contentious.
131 For English litigants that initially fail to consider relevant materials in Hansard in all
statutory interpretation cases, the other side's notice of the intent to refer to Hansard will trigger
the inquiry into legislative history. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing

special notice rules when a party seeks to rely on Hansard).
132 [1995] 3W.L.1R at630.
133 Id. at 645.
134 Id. See also Regina v. Wandsworth London Borough Council exparte Mansoor, [1996] 3
W.L.R 282, 293 (Eng. CA-) (rejecting use of legislative history that was not 'directed to the intended meaning of the provisions which the court is being asked to construe").
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any bearing on the provision before the court."'135 Although the House
of Lords opined that by foreclosing consideration of such statements it
was preventing "much expense and delay,"' 36 the loosening of the faulty
text requirement has increased expenses, and a stricter reliability requirement will not relieve litigants of the additional expenses caused by
the need to research legislative history.
In addition to strengthening the clarity requirement in Melluish, the
House of Lords also included words of stern warning to litigants who
present courts with legislative history that is unreliable because it lacks
any clearly signified intent. The House of Lords stated that "[j]udges
should be astute to check such misuse of the new rule [in Pepper] by making appropriate orders as to costs wasted."137 This admonition, which
was clearly foreshadowed in the Pepper decision,138 puts litigants in the
position of having to decide whether relevant legislative history has sufficient clarity, and thus reliability, to present to a court in support of an intentionalist construction. Given how English courts have been willing to
view clear statutory texts as faulty so that they may consider the legislative
histories, litigants may have to risk censure and costs by providing courts
with legislative materials that the courts may or may not find to be sufficiently clear. This burden rests unfairly on litigants: English courts appear willing to abandon the foundationalism of textualism, and yet
nevertheless desire to have litigants decide at their peril whether the legislative history is sufficiently clear to support a particular intentionalist
interpretation. This is very unlike the situation in the United States
where lawyers typically write briefs that present the best possible textualist, intentionalist, and purposivist arguments in favor of their preferred
interpretation of the statute and then leave the court with the responsibility of determining what the statute really means. 13 9
Other post-Pepper cases also have declined to give intentionalist interpretations because the legislative history did not meet the clearly sigIn Hillsdown Holdings, pic v. Pensions
nified intent requirement.
Ombudsman, for example, the Queen's Bench Division held that it was
barred from considering post-enactment legislative history because such
materials could not clearly signify legislative intent.140 The court accordingly declined to consider a minister's statements, which were made after
a bill's enactment, because it believed the statement could not show the
intent behind legislation previously considered by Parliament.1 4 1 In
135 MeUuish, [1995] 3 W.L.R. at 645.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See Pepper, [1993J 1 All E.R. at 67.
139 In his Article comparing the use of legislative history in the United States and England,
ProfessorJordan points out that the English litigation system differs markedly from the American

system because, in England, "there is nothing approaching the extensive nature of the American
brief." Jordan, supra note 28, at 37.
140 [1997] 1 All E.R. 862 (Q.B.). Post-enactment legislative history is viewed skeptically, but
is not categorically rejected, by U.S. courts. See genera/y ESKRMGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at
806-13.
141 See [1997] 1 All E.R. at 898-899.
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other cases, courts have rejected reliance on legislative history when the
ministers' statements were viewed as no clearer than the statutory text itself.142
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. courts have, for many years, utilized contrasting approaches to
statutory interpretation. These varied approaches to the interpretation
of statutes cause uncertainty for litigants and doctrinal inconsistency.
Perhaps the most controversial interpretive approach in the United
States has been intentionalism, which relies on the intent of Congress to
determine the meaning of a statute, even if that inferred intent is inconsistent with the meaning of clear statutory text. Uncertainty and inconsistency are likely to continue to characterize the U.S. law of
interpretation because courts are unlikely to mandate a uniform interpretive approach for their decision making and because the contextual
approaches of both intentionalism and purposivism reduce the predictability of interpretations because context may lead to a conclusion that
the legislature did not mean what the statutory text says. Indeed, in the
unlikely event that the law of interpretation would evolve to yield greater
consistency in interpretive method, it should abandon textualism and
accept the uncertainty of context: "A good interpretive approach requires that courts consider more than mere text; they must carefully
consider context as well." 143
The law of statutory interpretation in England has traditionally been
more certain and consistent than in the United States because English
courts foreclosed the intentionalist approach to interpretation by barring the use of legislative history to discern what the legislature meant by
particular statutory text. In Pepper v. Hart, the House of Lords abandoned this exclusionary rule and accepted the use of the intentionalist
approach to statutory interpretation. To be sure, the House of Lords insisted that the statutory text be faulty before a court would be permitted
to consult legislative history. As Pepper itself and later decisions show,
however, the faulty text requirement is unlikely to preclude the use of
apparently definitive and authoritative legislative history to trump a determinate statutory text. Now that English courts have accepted that the
meaning of particular statutory language is based on context as well as
text, they will rely on determinate context to fix statutory meaning. To
that extent, Pepper has had the effect of Americanizing the English law of
statutory interpretation, notwithstanding the desires and concerns that

142 See Regina v. Deegan, [19981 2 Grim. App. 121 (Eng. GA); Avon County Council v.
Hooper, [1997] 1 All E.R 532 (Eng. CA); Van Dyck v. Secretary of State for the Env't, [1993] 1
E.G.L.R1 186 (Eng. CA.); Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l Ltd. v. Price Waterhouse, [1997] 4
All E.R 781 (Ch.).
143 Michael P. Heal, The Attraction and Limits of Textualism: The Supreme Court Decision in
PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 5 N.YU. Envtl. L.J. 382, 442

(1996).
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson articulated when he abandoned the traditional
English exclusionary rule. 144

144 These desires and concerns are quoted in the text accompanying supranotes 45-48.

